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EPISTEMIC INDETERMINISM AND METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM: 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN KARL POPPER AND FRIEDRICH HAYEK1
José F. Martínez Solano
Abstract. This paper explores the link between the case for indeterminism in an
epistemological fashion and methodological individualism in the thought of two
defenders of both stances: Karl Popper and Friedrich Hayek. The relation between these
issues has not received much attention before and even less so with regard to these two
thinkers. First, Popper’s defence of indeterminism from an epistemic viewpoint and
Hayek’s views about the indeterminism of action are studied. Second, their positions
about methodological individualism are considered. Finally, several comparative
questions are aired.
Key words: Indeterminism, methodological individualism, Popper, Hayek.
Karl Popper and Friedrich Hayek share the case for indeterminism from an
epistemic point of view. Both thinkers regard this kind of indeterminism as a
necessary condition to understand their own positions in relation to the
methodology of the social sciences. They also coincide in accepting individualism
mainly from a methodological point of view. But they root this methodological
principle for the social sciences in epistemological soil, which both place in an
indeterminist conception. However, there are relevant differences between the
two philosophers when they address the relation between epistemological
indeterminism and methodological individualism.
1 This paper is within research project FFI2008-05948 sponsored by the Spanish Ministry of
Science and Innovation. I greatly appreciate Professor Wenceslao J. Gonzalez’s comments on this
paper and Professor John Worrall for sponsor my research at the Centre for the Philosophy of
Natural and Social Sciences at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where this
paper was finished.
MARTÍNEZ SOLANO, J. F., “Epistemic Indeterminism and Methodological Individualism: A Comparison
between Karl Popper and Friedrich Hayek,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Peruvian Journal of Epistemology,
monographic issue on Freedom and Determinism, v. 1, (2012), pp. 113-135.
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From the very beginning of his career as a philosopher, Popper was very
aware of the philosophical implications the debate about the existence of
indeterminism or determinism had for all the realms of reality.2 Initially,3 he
rejected indeterminism — due to his interpretation at that time of the development
of physics from the beginnings of the Twentieth century — and he accepted
physical causality (and the determinism it implies) as a methodological rule,
although both have a mainly metaphysical character.4 But that situation did not
last long, for he was to change his mind and favour a clear indeterminist position.5
Popper’s change of mind became apparent after he undertook investigations
in the field of the human and social sciences.6 Those investigations focused on
the criticism of historicism — a philosophical stance according to which the main
task of the social sciences is predicting the future course of human history —7
and he plainly defended methodological individualism.8 Later, he went deeper
into his indeterminist position which he applied beyond questions related to
physics.9
Hayek was a conspicuous figure in the Austrian School of economics. His
2 Cf. POPPER, K. R., Logik der Forschung, Springer, Vienna, 1935.
3 Cf. Logik der Forschung, p. 168.
4 Cf. POPPER, K. R., Logik der Forschung, p. 195.
5 Cf. POPPER, K. R., “Indeterminism in Quantum Physics and in Classical Physics,” The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, v. 1, nn. 2 and 3, (1950), pp. 117-133 and 173-195
respectively.
6 On the changes in the philosophy of Popper, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “La evolución del
Pensamiento de Popper,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Karl Popper: Revisión de su legado, Unión
Editorial, Madrid, 2004, pp. 23-194.
7 Cf. POPPER, K. R., The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1957. See
on this GONZALEZ, W. J., “La interpretación historicista de las Ciencias Sociales,” Anales de
Filosofía, v. 2, (1984), pp. 109-137.
8 Some Popper’s followers extended his ideas on methodological individualism and produced to
some extent different versions of it, cf. AGASSI, J., “Methodological Individualism,” The British
Journal of Sociology, v. 11, n. 3, (1960), pp. 244-270; and WATKINS, J. W. N., “Ideal Types and
Historical Explanation,” in FEIGL, H. and BRODBECK, M. (eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of
Science, Appleton-Century-Crofts, N. York, 1953, pp. 723-743. On the one hand, Agassi tries to
improve the relation between individualism and the existence of institutions, whilst on the other
Watkins is a defender of individualism but from a psychologistic viewpoint, cf. UDÉHN, L., “The
Changing Face of Methodological Individualism,” Annual Review of Sociology, v. 28, (2002), pp.
479-507; particularly, p. 488.
9 Cf. POPPER, K. R., The Open Universe. An Argument for Indeterminism, Routledge, London,
1982. The book belongs to the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery and was written
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libertarian philosophical principles led him to give a particular methodological
interpretation for the social sciences, and singularly to economics. Methodological
individualism has an important role in it, which was the main reason he rejected
socialism and methodological holism,10 as he rooted his study in human freedom
and used it as a guide-principle. He also offered a contrary view to determinism.
That view had an epistemological flavour since he emphasized the importance
that limitations in the knowledge individuals have when they make decisions and
also for the work of the social scientist, who studies the results of such decision-
making.
This paper focuses on two main elements and their consequences. First, it
analyses two thematic aspects in parallel: on the one hand, Popperian
epistemological indeterminism — which is the axis of his argument against
historicism in the social sciences — and, on the other, Hayekian position about
the indeterminacy of human action in whose defence he uses epistemological
arguments. Second, it compares the Popperian position on methodological
individualism with that of Hayek. Third, several questions about the relationship
between both philosophical stances arise from the previous analysis.
1. POPPERIAN INDETERMINISM AND HAYEK’S VIEW
Around the mid 1950s, Popper wrote a prologue for his book The Poverty of
Historicism where he proposed what he thought was a definitive argument against
historicism and in which he included epistemological elements.11 By then he had
also written a Postscript for his first published book in which he stressed that
epistemological argument from an indeterminist perspective applied to physics
as well as to the social sciences.
For his part, Hayek had stressed from the thirties a peculiar position about
during the fifties, when his first published book, Logik der Forschung, was being translated into
English.
10 Cf. HAYEK, F. A., “Scientism and the Study of Society,” Economica, v. 9, n. 35, (1942), pp.
267-291; Economica, v. 10, n. 37, (1943), pp. 34-63; and Economica, v. 11, n. 41, (1944), pp. 27-
39. Later published as HAYEK, F. A., “Scientism and the Study of Society,” in HAYEK, F. A., The
Counter-Revolution of Science. Studies in the Abuse of Reason, Free Press, Glencoe, 1952, pp.
11-102 and pp. 207-221 for endnotes.
11 Cf. POPPER, K. R., The Poverty of Historicism, pp. xi-xiii.
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the influence knowledge of the individuals has when they make decisions that
affect their actions. His stance took as its point of departure the cognitive
limitations of those individuals.12 Later, during the fifties, he linked that idea with
a thesis against determinism and about the impossibility of exact prediction in the
social sciences.13
It is within that historic and systematic framework that indeterminism in both
thinkers is broached here. First we begin by studying the different kinds of
determinisms according to Popper’s own classification. His criticisms on
determinism are the starting point because — in his opinion — if it is refuted,
then we may defend indeterminism. Popperian epistemic argument against
determinism is also dealt with. In the end, with the acceptance of indeterminism,
Popper wanted to open the way to the existence of freedom and the possibility of
human creativity from a philosophical point of view. Later, in the second part of
this section, Hayek’s position is considered. He is in favour of the absence of
determinism in human action. The Austrian economist’s arguments are also
epistemological, although from the point of view of cognitive psychology.
1.1. Karl Popper’s Indeterminism: An Epistemic View
Popper distinguishes three different kinds of determinism:14 religious,
physical or “scientific,”15 and metaphysical.16 In his opinion, the first is the oldest
12 Cf. HAYEK, F. A., “Economics and Knowledge,” Economica, v. IV, (1937), pp. 33-54. Compiled
in LITTLECHILD, S. (ed.), Austrian Economics. Vol. III, E. Elgar, Aldershot, 1990, pp. 28-49.
13 Cf. HAYEK, F. A., “The Theory of Complex Phenomena,” in BUNGE, M. (ed.), The Critical
Approach to Science and Philosophy, The Free Press, N. York, 1964, pp. 332-349; particularly,
pp. 346-347.
14 Cf. POPPER, K. R., The Open Universe. An Argument for Indeterminism, pp. 5-8.
15 Popper calls physical determinism the same kind of determinism he had called “scientific” in
The Open Universe, cf. POPPER, K. R., “Of Clouds and Clocks,” in POPPER, K. R., Objective
Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979, pp. 206-255; particularly, p. 210. He uses
quotation marks in “scientific” because he thinks that that character is only alleged. For him, it
has no scientific base, cf. The Open Universe, p. xxi.
16 Popper points out the existence of yet another kind of determinism, which he calls philosophical
or psychological and attributes to Hume. According to Popper, that Humean position maintains
that “like causes produce like effects.” However, he refuses to take it into account due to a lack of
philosophical burden. Moreover, he considers it compatible with physical indeterminism, cf.
POPPER, K. R., “Of Clouds and Clocks,” p. 220.
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form of determinism. With the exception of Christian theology, initiated by Saint
Augustine and continued later by Catholicism,17 religious determinism stresses
basically that all events in the world has been decided or known in advance by
God, who consequently is omniscient and omnipotent regarding them.
The second form of determinism — physical or “scientific” — is the main
aim of Popper’s criticisms. He thinks that this form of determinism might be
characterized as the doctrine that the structure of the world is such that every event
can be rationally predicted, with any desired precision, if a complete description
of the past events is given to us, along with all the laws of nature.18
Popper thinks that sort of determinism is indeed a version of the first one, where
God’s omniscience and omnipotence is attributed now to nature. But there is a
crucial difference, for if human being could know all the details of nature’s
working, then he or she will be able to predict its behaviour. Because of that,
Popper overemphasizes in this respect the possibility or not of knowing in detail
all the conditions in which reality is.
The third way of understanding determinism is labelled by Popper as
“metaphysical.” According to his characterization, metaphysical determinists
maintain that all the events of the world are fixed, are inalterable and are
predetermined. Popper thinks that this kind of determinism is in fact included in
the previous ones due to its logical weakness. He says that this weakness is mainly
due to its lack of falsifiability, because of its metaphysical character.
Popper considers all the cases, particularly “scientific” determinism, as
baseless and that the analysis he makes incapacitates them. His arguments make
possible a general defence of indeterminism,19 not only for the human and social
sciences but also for the natural sciences. The main argument is epistemological
as it is based on the limitation of the knowledge of individuals, with special
reference to scientific prediction.20
17 Cf. POPPER, K. R., The Open Universe, p. 5.
18 Cf. The Open Universe, pp. 1-2.
19 He propounds two arguments (the approximate character of scientific knowledge and the
asymmetry between the past and the future) before dealing with which he considers definitive in
the case for indeterminism, cf. The Open Universe, pp. 41-47 and 55-57.
20 On scientific prediction in Popper, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “The Many Faces of Popper’s
Methodological Approach on Prediction,” in CATTON, PH. and MACDONALD, G. (eds.), Karl Popper.
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Popper’s general argumentation runs along the lines of the logical
impossibility for the agents to anticipate their knowledge of the future: that agents
know at one precise moment what they only can know after time goes by. Hence,
those individuals cannot predict the future state of their own knowledge about the
situations they are involved in and, therefore, they cannot control the ultimate
consequences of their actions,21 because, in such a case, they would control them
at the same moment they knew them, so prediction would not be necessary.
For Popper, individuals cannot predict what they are going to know in the
future, because in that case they would already know at that precise moment what
they allegedly are going to know only at a later moment, when whatever events
are happening. In his opinion, “we cannot predict, scientifically, results which we
shall obtain in the course of the growth of our knowledge.”22
From that point of view, what Popper is maintaining is that the human future
is open,23 so it only depends on chance. In this sense, for Popper future is
indeterminate, in other words it is objectively not fixed.24 Popper particularises
that idea for the case of human decision-making, i.e., for the case of human and
social issues. In that sense, he maintains that “we cannot replace our decisions by
scientific predictions about our own future actions (since predictions of this kind
are impossible).”25 In other words, it is not possible for us not to make decisions
and use prediction about what is going to happen or about what we are going to
provoke in the future. But, furthermore, we cannot control the consequences of
Critical Appraisals, Routledge, London, 2004, pp. 78-98.
21 As may be seen, Popper’s arguments against determinism rely heavily on the question of
predictability. It is precisely that idea that has been considered a flaw in his argumentation for
there is no reason why there has to be a relation between the impossibility of prediction and
absence of determinism. Cf. EARMAN, J., A Primer on Determinism, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986, pp.
8-10 and 242-243; WEATHERFORD, R., The Implications of Determinism, Routledge, London, 1991,
pp. 154-158; and CLARK, P., “Popper on Determinism,” in O’HEAR, A. (ed.), Karl Popper:
Philosophy and Problems, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 149-176;
particularly, pp. 152-153.
22 POPPER, K. R., The Open Universe, p. 62. Italics are Popper’s.
23 Professor Clark casts doubts also upon the relation Popper establishes between the alleged
openness of the world and the impossibility to predict, cf. CLARK, P., “Popper on Determinism,”
p. 158.
24 Cf. POPPER, K. R., A World of Propensities, Thoemmes Press, Bristol, 1990, p. 18.
25 The Open Universe, p. 80. Popper’s italics.
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our actions either.26
This plainly epistemic defence of the existence of freedom is also the
definitive argument in the case for physical indeterminism.27 The very existence
of rational knowledge is the touchstone in his defence of indeterminism.28 From
the Popperian viewpoint, “we are ‘free’ […] not because we are subject to chance
rather than to strict natural laws, but because the progressive rationalization of
the world — the attempt to catch the world in the net of knowledge — has limits,
at any moment, in the growth of knowledge itself which, of course, is also a
process that belongs to the world.”29 But indeterminism itself is not enough to
explain freedom and human creativity in Popper’s opinion.30
Sustaining those two human traits, Popper resorts to ontological arguments,
in particular a conception about reality of his own. He thinks reality is divided in
three realms: World 1 (physical), World 2 (mental) and World 3 (among other
elements, the world of scientific theories). He strongly believes that physical world
1 is related to the other two. It is precisely that causal openness of these three
realms what — in his opinion — guarantees that human world is a space for
actions and not simple behaviour. This is the key element in understanding the
Popperian thesis about the existence of an open universe.31
Therefore, although the argumentative thread in Popper’s defence of
indeterminism is epistemological, indeterminism is not only epistemological in
his approach. It certainly includes the acceptance of ontological indeterminism,
which not only affects phenomena of a human and social kind but also includes
events of a natural kind. In this sense, Popper says that there are propensities in
the world. These propensities justify the possibility of the human being acting
26 This is the problem Popper calls the ‘Oedipus effect,’ which is set out in POPPER, K. R., The
Poverty of Historicism, p. 13.
27 Popperian defence of the existence of freedom is mainly in POPPER, K. R., “Of Clouds and
Clocks,” pp. 206-234.
28 Cf. POPPER, K. R., The Open Universe, p. 80. However, in Professor Clark’s opinion, Popper’s
argument about non-predictability also shed doubts about the rationality of science itself, cf.
CLARK, P., “Popper on Determinism,” p. 153.
29 POPPER, K. R., The Open Universe, p. 81. 
30 Cf. The Open Universe, p. 114.
31 Cf. POPPER, K. R., The Open Universe, pp. 128-130.
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freely and for his/her decision not to be completely shaped by previous events,
but that does not permit the control of the results of those actions, for they would
be completely unexpected. In his view, “past situations, whether physical or
psychological or mixed, do not determine the future situation. Rather, they
determine changing propensities that influence the future situations without
determining them in a unique way.”32
1.2. Hayek’s Position: Limits in Knowledge and Indetermination in Human
Action
Hayek’s approach also focuses on the question of the case for human freedom
from an epistemic perspective. In effect, he starts from the idea of the scarce
information individuals have access to when they make decisions in the situations
they find themselves. For Hayek, there is a “constitutional limitation of man’s
knowledge and interests, [an individual] cannot know more than a tiny part of the
whole of society and that therefore all that can enter into his motives are the
immediate effects which his actions will have in the sphere he knows.”33
That limitation in knowledge has both direct and indirect consequences.
Among them one, in his opinion, is that which leads to “an attitude of humility
toward the impersonal and anonymous social processes by which individuals help
to create things greater than they know.”34 In other words, individual agent
creativity can go far beyond what they themselves might think, for the parts —
agents — produce a whole — society — only partially known by individuals.
Hayekian defence of human freedom and his approach to it have as basic
framework that central issue: the constitutive limitation of knowledge that human
beings have. For him, “the case for individual freedom rests chiefly on the
recognition of the inevitable ignorance of all of us concerning a great many of the
factors on which the achievement of our ends and welfare depends.”35
32 POPPER, K. R., A World of Propensities, pp. 17-18. Popper’s italics.
33 HAYEK, F. A., “Individualism: True and False,” in HAYEK, F. A., Individualism and Economic
Order, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1949, p. 14.
34 HAYEK, F. A., “Individualism: True and False,” in HAYEK, F. A., Individualism and Economic
Order, p. 8.
35 HAYEK, F. A., The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London, 1960, p. 29.
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To the situation of ignorance that accompanies every human being — his or
her inability to grasp all social contexts — Hayek adds limitations in the very
capacity to know due to the very functioning of the human mind. The key in this
point is that, when the human mind tries to know reality, it faces phenomena of
great complexity (the understanding of its own workings included). There is a
restriction of knowledge because of the complexity of phenomena, a limitation
that arises in the first place on the realm of the external world.
That limitation can be clearly seen in the possibility for individuals to give a
detailed explanation of a fact or a particular situation. Hayek applies this at two
levels: a) in the case of individuals that act in a particular situation; and b) in those
that study the behaviour of those individuals. In his view, reality has levels of
complexity, which makes it difficult to explain many of its aspects. In this sense,
he deems it impossible, for logical reasons, to explain situations or elements of a
concrete complexity by using instruments that are of a lesser complexity than the
reality to explain.36
Hayek thinks that “any apparatus of classification must possess a structure
of a higher degree of complexity than is possessed by the objects which it
classifies.”37 But this is not the case when we try to account for a complete image
of the world, because “a complete explanation of even the external world as we
know it would presuppose a complete explanation of the working of our senses
and our mind. If the latter is impossible, we shall also be unable to provide a full
explanation of the phenomenal world.”38
This inability to grasp the whole thing also happens when the one who explains
is the social scientist. In this case, Hayek thinks that there is “no explaining agent
who can ever explain objects of its own kind, or its own degree of complexity, and,
therefore, that the human brain can never fully explain its own operations.”39 So it
36 On Hayek’s thoughts about scientific “explanation,” cf. HAYEK, F. A., “Degrees of
Explanation,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, v. 6, (1955), pp. 209-225.
Compiled with additions in HAYEK, F. A., Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967, pp. 3-21.
37 HAYEK, F. A., The Sensory Order, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1952, p. 185.
38 The Sensory Order, p. 194.
39 HAYEK, F. A., The Sensory Order, p. 185.
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is not a circumstantial limitation but a structural one.
Consequently, Hayek thinks that, despite the knowledge scientists have about
the workings of the human mind, it is impossible to establish the whole set of
particular facts that bring about a particular action of an individual at a given
moment. In that case, human personality (which he understands in the sense of
the whole of the human mind) remains an unapproachable phenomenon. So
specific actions of the individuals cannot “predict or control, because we could
not obtain the information on all the particular facts which determined it.”40
This limitation, which Hayek understands from a cognitive point of view, has
other epistemological consequences for the issue at stake here. It is a means for
Hayek to reject that any kind of determinism can be proved in science. In this
sense, he says that “there may well be valid and more grave philosophical
objections to the claim that science can demonstrate a universal determinism; but
for all practical purposes the limits created by the impossibility of ascertaining
all the particular data required to derive detailed conclusions from our theories
are probably much narrower. Even if the assertion of a universal determinism
were meaningful, scarcely any of the conclusions usually derived from it would
therefore follow.”41
For Hayek, the outcome of the study of the workings of cognitive phenomena
is that it is not possible to know whether we are determined in our actions or not.
So it may occur that there is an indeterminacy of action from the point of view of
actors. In that sense, Hayek says that “even though we may know the general
principle by which all human action is causally determined by physical processes,
this would not mean that to us a particular human action can ever be recognizable
as the necessary result of a particular set of physical circumstances.”42
But Hayek avoids giving a clear personal solution with respect to the classical
debate between those who defend the existence of determinism and those who
are for the possibility that human will is free. So from an ontological point of view
40 HAYEK, F. A., “The Theory of Complex Phenomena,” in HAYEK, F. A., Studies in Philosophy,
Politics and Economics, p. 37.
41 HAYEK, F. A., “The Theory of Complex Phenomena,” p. 37.
42 HAYEK, F. A., The Sensory Order, p. 193. Italics added.
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Hayek neither denies determinism, i.e., the position according to which reality
(and we in it) is causally closed (something Popper does), nor does he want to
state openly and categorically that human will is free. He regards that maintaining
that “the will is free has as little meaning as its denial and that the whole issue is
a phantom problem, a dispute about words in which the contestants have not made
clear what an affirmative or a negative answer would imply.”43
Nonetheless, when he deals with the dispute between determinists and
supporters of the freedom of the will, Hayek seems to be closer to the latter. He
states that “the voluntarists are more nearly right, while the determinists are merely
confused.”44 That is why he attacks them, saying that “all those factors whose
influence is sometimes inconsistently denied by those who deny the ‘freedom of
the will,’ such as reasoning or argument, persuasion or censure, or the expectation
of praise and blame, are really among the most important factors determining the
personality and through it the particular action of the individual.”45
In fact, Hayek takes a wary position before the ontological problem about
whether there is determinism or freedom, an issue he regards as irresolvable.46
However, that does not mean that Hayek does not think there is indeterminism in
the decision that agents make, i.e., that individual freedom is possible from the
point of view of the subjective possibility of choice or even from the moral and
legal dimension of human action. Because, as he sees it, “to us human decisions
must always appear as the result of the whole of a human personality — that
means the whole of a person’s mind — which, as we have seen, we cannot reduce
to something else,”47 and that human personality is regarded by Hayek as
“essential to the conception of freedom and responsibility.”48
The peculiar indeterminism that Hayek defends has then a clear
43 HAYEK, F. A., The Constitution of Liberty, p. 73.
44 The Constitution of Liberty, p. 73.
45 HAYEK, F. A., The Constitution of Liberty, p. 74.
46 Professor Gray highlights the fact that Hayek did not seem to want his arguments in favour of
the existence of freedom in human action to be of help in resolving the debate between freedom
and determinism, cf. GRAY, J. N., “F. A. Hayek on Liberty and Tradition,” The Journal of
Libertarian Studies, v. IV, n. 2, (1980), pp. 119-137; particularly, p. 122.
47 HAYEK, F. A., The Sensory Order, p. 193.
48 HAYEK, F. A., The Constitution of Liberty, p. 72.
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anthropological sense, because it affects mainly the realm of human action and is
considered only from the point of view of the individual. Moreover, that view of
indeterminism represents a ground for his defence of methodological
individualism,49 for it explains individual ability to act without being compelled
(not even subconsciously) by the context he or she is in.
Thus, it can be said that Hayek defends a methodological indeterminism as a
basic assumption for the method of research in human action. In this author there
is also a defence of an epistemological indeterminism insofar as we cannot know
all the elements that will influence our decisions as agents and therefore those
decisions are undetermined. The same happens regarding scientific research on
human action: We cannot know all the elements at stake when an agent or group
of agents makes decisions and which these decisions might be, which makes
prediction in detail impossible.
But Hayek does not defend indeterminism from an ontological perspective,
because — coherent with his own approach — he regards it as an unsolvable
problem, for the cognitive limits of human beings affects the root of the very issue.
The preference for the epistemological key in his approach makes one think of
Kantian roots of his thought.
2. METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM IN HAYEK AND POPPER
Within the methodology of the social sciences, methodological individualism
has been propounded as a fundamental principle by authors belonging to rather
different streams of thought.50 But the general question about how to understand
the notion of “individualism” has not been easy to clarify (and maybe it still is
not at all clear). This principle entails both epistemological aspects (the knowledge
of individuals who act in social situations) and purely methodological (how to
increase our knowledge about those social situations, which require individual
actions) and even ontological (the very individuals and the reality of their
49 More on this in DI IORIO, F., “The Sensory Order and the Neurophysiological Basis of
Methodological Individualism,” in BUTOS, W. N. (ed.), The Social Science of Hayek’s The Sensory
Order, Emerald, Bingley, 2010, pp. 179-209; particularly, pp. 189-192.
50 Cf. UDÉHN, L., “The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism,” pp. 480-497.
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interactions).51
Among the epistemological aspects is included the tendency to think that in
social sciences it is not possible to know future actions of the individuals because
those actions — as they are free — are not determined or conditioned except for
the decisions individuals make or by the complexity of the particular situations
in which they are produced. Consequently, it is very difficult to predict
scientifically in those realms. This thesis connects methodological individualism
with ideas that presuppose the acceptance of some kind of indeterminism in
society which should be accounted for by social sciences.52
Friedrich Hayek and Karl Popper occupy an important place in the treatment
of the question of individualism. From their respective approaches they have
thought about methodological individualism, in close relation to an
epistemological one, and have also reflected on ontological individualism. Both
have insisted mainly on the methodological vein of individualism and have delved
deeper into the epistemological foundations, which they locate in a view that has
an indeterminist ground.
2.1. Hayek’s Methodological Individualism
According to Hayek, historically we can find two different types of general
approaches on individualism, one of which he considers as true and the other as
51 Recently, Professor Lars Udéhn has proposed a general classification for the kinds of
individualism. He regards there are four types: 1) Natural or atomistic individualism that
historically coincides with the different theories of social contract and with the thesis of general
equilibrium. That type of individualism has not accounted for socio-cultural aspects and their
explanations. 2) Social individualism that is represented among others by the Austrian School,
including Hayek himself. In that position the idea of individuals as social beings is accepted and
their interrelations studied, including cultural aspects. 3) Institutional individualism that Udéhn
identifies whith Popperian approach although he is thinking of Agassi’s version. The study of
institutions is the core of this kind of individualism. And 4) Structural individualism that coincides
with James Coleman position and is common among methodological individualists close to
sociology and neomarxian currents in that discipline. In his view, types 1 and 2 are strong
individualism whereas he qualifies 3 and 4 as weak. He considers there is a jump from strong to
weak methodological individualism and says it is very difficult to talk about individualism and
holism as opposite doctrines. Cf. UDÉHN, L., “The Changing Face of Methodological
Individualism,” pp. 499-500.
52 Cf. ARROW, K. J., “Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge,” The American
Economic Review, v. 84, n. 2, (1994), pp. 1-9; especially, p. 4.
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false. Both approaches have their roots in two different ways of understanding
society and its study in the social sciences. In Hayek’s opinion, there is a true
individualism which is rooted in the British philosophy of the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth centuries — John Locke, Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, Josiah
Tucker, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith; and there is a false individualism, which
has its origin in the philosophy of Descartes and its development in European
continental philosophy.
Apart from properly historical questions, what Hayek names “true
individualism” is indeed a theory of society. With it, he tries to understand the
forces that rule human social life.53 This presupposes starting from the individual
and moving to the whole. He considers that there is no other way to understand
those social phenomena: only through the comprehension of the individual actions
directed towards other persons and guided by the behaviour is it expected of
them.54
From this starting point, Hayek views that the main reason to say that
individualism is the correct method to study social issues is that these issues are
the unforeseen result of individual actions.55 Unlike “false individualism,” which
is chiefly maintained by continental rationalist thinkers, the order noticed in
society and its institutions is not — according to Hayek — at all due to any kind
of deliberate design, rather the contrary.56 So individuals are the ones who, with
their free decisions, gradually and inadvertently built up society and the
institutions that make it work.
Beginning with the general and dual approach about individualism, Hayek
proposes a particular methodological aspect. In its origin, the expression
“methodological individualism” was coined by Joseph Schumpeter, who
introduced the term in 1908 to use it in the realm of his studies in
53 Cf. HAYEK, F. A., “Individualism: True and False,” pp. 1-32; particularly, p. 6.
54 Cf. “Individualism: True and False,” p. 6.
55 Cf. HAYEK, F. A., “Individualism: True and False,” p. 8.
56 Cf. HAYEK, F. A., “The Results of Human Action but not of Human Design,” in HAYEK, F. A.,
Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967, pp. 96-
105. In accordance with Hayek, that “order” is “spontaneous” and is rooted in the free action of
individuals, cf. HAYEK, F. A., “The Principles of a Liberal Social Order,” in HAYEK, F. A., Studies
in Philosophy, Politics, and Economy, Routledge, London, 1967, pp. 160-177.
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economics.57 Hayek embraced it and during the 1940s intended to develop
Schumpeter’s idea within his discipline and sought to apply it also to political
philosophy.58 He also saw the potential of this principle as a methodological
resource in his writings on the methodology of the social sciences.59
Hayekian methodological individualism frontally objects the way of
understanding methodology of holist scientists: methodological collectivism. This
particular methodological position considers that the task of the social sciences is
the study and analysis of wholes with which we can categorize social reality. In
the Hayek interpretation, methodological collectivism is the “tendency to treat
‘wholes’ like ‘society’ or the ‘economy,’ ‘capitalism’ (as a given historical ‘phase’)
or a particular ‘industry’ or ‘class’ or ‘country’ as definitely given objects about
which we can discover laws by observing their behaviour as wholes.”60
Hayek goes further: he regards “wholes” as pseudo-entities that holist
scientists misunderstand as facts. He refutes that social ontology: those wholes
do not exist, i.e., there is no “Society,” “Capitalism” or “Bourgeoisie,” etc.61 In
this sense, he states that “the error involved in this collectivist approach is that it
mistakes for facts what are no more than provisional theories, models constructed
by the popular mind to explain the connection between some of the individual
phenomena which we observe.”62
Against that holistic methodological view, of which he completely
disapproves, Hayek proposes his version of methodological individualism. He
57 Cf. UDÉHN, L., “The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism,” p. 484; and HODGSON,
G. M., “Meanings of Methodological Individualism,” Journal of Economic Methodology, v. 14,
n. 2, (2007), pp. 211-226; particularly, pp. 211-212.
58 Cf. HAYEK, F. A., The Road to Serfdom, George Routledge and Sons, London, 1944.
59 Cf. HAYEK, F. A., The Counter-Revolution of Science. Studies in the Abuse of Reason, Free
Press, Glencoe, 1952.
60 HAYEK, F., The Counter-Revolution of Science, p. 53.
61 Nonetheless, Hayek does not maintain an atomist position with his version of methodological
individualism. Like other thinkers in the Austrian School, he is well aware that social interaction
of the individuals is what constitutes his object of study. On the general question about whether
methodological individualism is to be understood strictly in relation to individuals or should take
into account their social interaction, see ARROW, K. J., “Methodological Individualism and Social
Knowledge,” pp. 1-9; and HODGSON, G. M., “Meanings of Methodological Individualism,” pp.
211-226.
62 HAYEK, F., The Counter-Revolution of Science, p. 54.
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holds that the methodological starting point of all social science has to focus on
concrete individuals and the decisions they make in the environment they belong
to at every moment. In his view, individualism as a method is to direct the focus
towards mechanisms ruling particular decisions of the subjects when they act —
that would be the characteristic component in methodological individualism —
which Hayek relates to a clear-cut subjectivist position.63 That subjectivist
approach is specified in the idea that the study “starts […] from our knowledge
of the inside of these social complexes, the knowledge of the individual attitudes
which form the elements of their structure.”64
Thus, for Hayek, the proper way of explanation in the social sciences has to
start from that idea, which is particularized in the individuals and their decisions.
In the long run, those decisions are what shape the results of those social
complexes or institutions, although in a completely unforeseeable way.65 This
presupposes creativity in the social milieu and difficulties for scientific prediction,
which in Hayek opinion should be oriented to the identification of patterns instead
of particular events.
2.2. Popper’s Methodological Individualism
Popper adopted methodological individualism as a primary principle for his
methodology of the social sciences in the papers he published with the title The
Poverty of Historicism.66 He was influenced by a paper — Scientism and the Study
of Society —67 that Hayek published also in three parts a few years before in
Economica, the same journal as Popper did later. Unlike Hayek, who confers
on methodological individualism a general character within the social-
scientific framework, Popper uses it in a restricted way. He is interested only
insofar as it can be useful as a means to apply his own falsificationist position
63 Cf. The Counter-Revolution of Science, p. 38.
64 HAYEK, F., The Counter-Revolution of Science, p. 53.
65 Cf. HAYEK, F. A., “The Results of Human Action but not of Human Design,” pp. 96-105.
66 Cf. POPPER, K. R., “The Poverty of Historicism I,” Economica, v. 11, (1944), pp. 86-103; “The
Poverty of Historicism II. A Criticism of Historicist Methods,” Economica, v. 11, (1944), pp. 119-
137; and “The Poverty of Historicism III,” Economica, v. 12, (1945), pp. 69-89. See also POPPER,
K. R., The Poverty of Historicism, p. 149.
67 See footnote 10.
Cap 6_Maquetación 1  13/06/2013  13:00  Página 128
129Epistemic Indeterminism and Methodological Individualism
in the social sciences.
For Popper, methodological individualism is “the quite unassailable doctrine
that we must try to understand all collective phenomena as due to the actions,
interactions, aims, hopes, and thoughts of individual men, and as due to traditions
created and preserved by individual men.”68 Expressed in a more tangible
methodological perspective, methodological individualism is — in Popper’s view
— the thesis that stresses “that the ‘behaviour’ and the ‘actions’ of collectives,
such as states or social groups, must be reduced to the behaviour and to the
actionsof human individuals.”69
The view of Popper presupposes a methodological position that is both
reductionist, which was already in the Hayekian version, and nominalist. It is a
reductionism in that explanation of the social facts is reduced to the actions of
particular individuals. In this sense, Popper adds that “institutions (and traditions)
must be analysed in individualistic terms — that is to say, in terms of the relations
of individuals acting in certain situations, and of the unintended consequences of
their actions.”70
At this level, Popper also includes in his approach the relevant Hayekian
notion of the “unintended consequences” of actions, but adds an idea that is not
explicitly in Hayek: actions take place in a situation.71 For him, individual actions
have to be framed within a particular situation or problem-situation. This is the
link Popper establishes between his general methodology of science and his
methodology of the social sciences: individuals act to solve problems and they
do it according to the logic of the situation they are involved in.
In addition to that reductionist component, Popperian analysis has a
68 POPPER, K. R., The Poverty of Historicism, pp. 157-158.
69 POPPER, K. R., The Open Society and Its Enemies. Vol. 2: Hegel and Marx, Routledge, London,
5th edition, 1966, p. 91.
70 POPPER, K. R., The Open Society and Its Enemies. Vol. 2: Hegel and Marx, p. 324, note 11.
71 Popper found inspiration in the logic of choice of Hayek’s economic theory to draw up his
idea of the logic of the situation, cf. POPPER, K. R., “Models, Instruments, and Truth. The Status
of the Rationality Principle in the Social Sciences,” in POPPER, K. R., The Myth of the Framework,
Routledge, London, 1994, pp. 154-184; particularly, p. 181, note 1. There he warns this idea does
not include any determinist element, for it is based on the choices individuals make when they
are in a particular situation.
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nominalist element as well, for — in his opinion — “the task of social theory is
to construct and to analyse our sociological models carefully in descriptive or
nominalist terms, that is to say, in terms of individuals, of their attitudes,
expectations, relations, etc.”72 The “nominalism” (i.e., non-essentialism) that
Popper is defending here is methodological insofar as it tries to describe and
explain how the objects under study behave. But, from a metaphysical point of
view, Popper’s position goes further and considers there are no essences in these
alleged social objects, i.e., there is nothing universal in them.
Popper’s account of methodological individualism — as well as Hayek’s —
has received several criticisms.73 They focus on the general character of Popperian
methodological individualism and its lack of precision. In this line of thought it
has even been thought that Popper’s view is not really “methodological
individualism.” Possible inconsistencies between this methodological principle
and the institutionalist bias the Popperian approach relies on have also been
addressed,74 because the Popperian account can be used to understand the
existence of social institutions. However, these elements are indeed wholes within
which individuals have to act according to rules. Popperian insistence on
institutions seems to dissolve individualist basis in Popperian thought.
3. POPPER’S AND HAYEK’S APPROACHES COMPARED
In comparing Popper’s and Hayek’s approaches it remains quite clear that,
in principle, they maintained pretty similar positions about methodological
individualism. Nevertheless, there is a crucial difference to be seen between them.
For Hayek, methodological individualism has a clear subjectivist component, so
in social research what really matters is the beliefs and attitudes of individuals
72 POPPER, K. R., The Poverty of Historicism, p. 136. Popper’s italics.
73 Among them stands out LUKES, S., “Methodological Individualism Reconsidered,” British
Journal of Sociology, v. 19, n. 2, (1968), pp. 119-129.
74 In this sense, Popper says in the context of his criticisms of psychologism that “if motives (or
any other psychological or behaviourist concepts) are to be used in the explanation, then they must
be supplemented by a reference to the general situation, and especially to the environment. In the
case of human actions, this environment is very largely of a social nature; thus our actions cannot
be explained without reference to our social environment, to social institutions and to their manner
of functioning,” POPPER, K. R., The Open Society and Its Enemies, p. 90.
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and the method should be that of verstehen. In contrast, Popper is more worried
about the objective aspects, as he is seeking to find the logic of individuals’ actions
in order to explain social life.
Yet there is a thematic link between both thinkers, which is their concern
about the idea of freedom. It is there where both the Austrians coincide in their
defence — either implicit or explicit — of indeterminism. For Popper,
indeterminism is closely related to the traditional problem of “free will;”75 whereas
for Hayek his concern is the defence of freedom, even from political stances.
Both positions on indeterminism come together in both thinkers with special
reference to the problem of predictability in human actions. This convergence
takes place when two elements are linked: i) their views on individualism as a
social-scientific method; and ii) an epistemological stance in which the limits to
the knowledge subjects have of their situations are stressed.
Nonetheless, there is a clear difference between them related to that
indeterminism they are defending. On the one hand, Popper supports a position
that proposes a physical indeterminism, i.e., he strongly believes in the ontological
perspective of the problem and applies it to nature as well. On the other, Hayek
rejects determinism as a possibility of restriction to human freedom, but his point
of view is restricted to the purely social realm, without entering the question of a
more general indeterminism and without bringing it to nature.
Despite their differences, the joint contribution of Hayek and Popper — that
in my opinion makes their points of view alive and current today — is in the
defence they make of human freedom from a general anthropological perspective:
their interest — in a way yet not explicit enough — in recovering the idea of
“person.” Individualism, in which they include an indeterminist ground, connects
with the moral claim that human action is not in fact determined, not even by our
own desires, but that it is open to creativity and the evolution of human thought.
There exists a risk, however, of following the mainstream of those who, through
This approach might lead Popperian methodological individualism to amount to nothing because
in some way it disolves his individualist viewpoint. That is the reason why Professor Udéhn
qualifies Popperian methodological individualism as weak, cf. UDÉHN, L., “The Changing Face
of Methodological Individualism,” p. 500.
75 Cf. POPPER, K. R., The Open Universe. An Argument for Indeterminism, p. xix.
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the abuse of reason — in Hayekian words — put it above particular individuals
by so causing (probably inadvertently) the elimination of freedom.
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